Bovine tuberculosis (bTB), caused by Mycobacterium bovis, is a chronic disease typical of cattle. Nonetheless, it can affect many mammals including humans, making it one of the most widespread zoonotic diseases worldwide. In industrialized countries, the main pathways of introduction of bTB into a herd are animal trade and contact with infected wildlife. In addition, for slow-spreading diseases with a long latent period such as bTB, shared seasonal pastures might be a between-herd transmission pathway, indeed farmers might unknowingly send infected animals to the pasture, since clinical signs are rarely evident in early infection. In this study, we developed a dynamic stochastic model to represent the spread of bTB in pastures.
trade movements of infected animals represent one of the main pathways of introduction of bTB into a herd (Gilbert et al., 2005) .
Another source of bTB can be the contact with infected wildlife species, such as wood bison and wapiti (Nishi, Shury, & Elkin, 2006) , as well as European badgers, white-tailed deer, and possums (Pfeiffer, 2013; and references therein) . Management practices can also play a role in between-herd transmission of bTB. In fact, studies have shown that, both for Canadian and Michigan (US) herds, the sharing of pastures with or in proximity to an infected herd has been associated with a higher probability of testing positive to bTB (Kaneene, Bruning-Fann, Granger, Miller, & Porter-Spalding, 2002; Munroe, Dohoo, McNab, & Spangler, 1999) .
Moving animals to seasonal pasture lands is a well-established practice for many livestock industries worldwide, including cattle, horses, sheep, and goats. A common practice in countries such as Canada and the United States is the use of seasonally shared or community pastures. These lands are usually co-managed and they can harbour mixed groups of cow-calf pairs and bulls that are managed separately for the rest of the year (Sheppard et al., 2015; Siegwart, Hilbe, Hässig, & Braun, 2006) . From an epidemiological point of view, seasonal pastures can enhance the spread of infectious diseases between herds (Palisson, Courcoul, & Durand, 2017) , as they might facilitate potentially infectious contacts between otherwise separated groups of animals (Waret-Szkuta, Ortiz-Pelaez, Pfeiffer, Roger, & Guitian, 2011) . Pastures have been shown effective for the spread of diseases transmitted by different types of contacts, including direct (Kaneene et al., 2002; Valle, Martin, Tremblay, & Bateman, 1999) , indirect (Nusinovici, Hoch, Brahim, Joly, & Beaudeau, 2017) , and through vectors (Pioz et al., 2014) .
For diseases such as bTB, this represents a challenge for epidemic control and surveillance, as farmers might unknowingly move sub-clinically infected animals to and from community pastures.
This particular problem was evident during a recent outbreak in Western Canada, where 15 herds had to be destroyed due to high-risk direct contact via commingling on pasture with a cow-calf herd that was found positive to bTB in September 2016 (CFIA, 2018) .
Canada is considered officially free from bTB according to domestic criteria in the Health of Animals Regulations, with only sporadic localized outbreaks detected over the past decade (El Allaki, Harrington, & Howden, 2016) . Moreover, the epidemiological investigation showed that the strain involved in the 2016 outbreak was different from others previously isolated from Canadian herds or wildlife (CFIA, 2018) . This raised several epidemiological questions regarding the introduction into the index herd, in particular when it could have happened, and how likely the infection could have spread to other herds on shared pastures.
The main objectives of this study were, first, to estimate the time of introduction of bTB in the index herd of the 2016 outbreak, using a stochastic mathematical model representing the spread of bTB within a cow-calf herd characterized by seasonal management. Second, to model the potential spread of bTB to other herds, by extending the model to a framework with multiple herds, in which the main contact between herds is the sharing of pasture land during summer.
The last objective was to use the model to explore two different strategies (single whole herd test and depopulation vs. quarantine and repeated whole herd tests) for the detection of potentially infected herds among the high-risk contacts herds.
| MATERIALS AND METHODS
Two mathematical models were developed: the index-herd model and the pasture model. The former was developed to represent the spread of bTB in the index herd and thus to estimate the time of introduction. The pasture model could be considered a meta-population extension of the index-herd model, to which potential for bTB between-farm spread was added. The main between-herd spread mechanism was the use of the same pasture by different herds simultaneously, but another type of high-risk direct contact (shared bull use) identified during the epidemiological investigation in the 2016 outbreak was also included (CFIA, 2018) . This model was simulated using the parameters previously estimated with the index-herd model.
Both models were stochastic and simulation-based, with each simulation of bTB spread running from the introduction of a single infected but not yet infectious cow, to the bTB detection by the surveillance system and following testing. In case the bTB outbreak was not detected, the pasture model simulation stopped in September 2016 (the observed outbreak detection time).
Information about all involved herds was obtained from the epidemiological investigation conducted by the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) ( Table 1 ). The next sections describe the herd demographic (2.1), the index-herd and pasture models (2.2 and 2.3, respectively), and finally the surveillance system (2.4).
| Herds demographic
The herds demographics parameters (reported in Table 2 ) were based on the 2014 Western Canada Cow-Calf Survey (Western Beef Development Centre, 2015) . The respondents to this voluntary survey (411 farmers) accounted for 76,000 breeding females or 2.2% of the 3.45 million cows reported by Statistics Canada to be in Western Canada as of July 1, 2013. The survey was distributed at producer meetings and events, as well as beef industry conferences.
Results were assumed to be representative of common management practices in Western Canadian cow-calf herds.
Herds included four sex/age categories of animals: cows, heifers, bulls, and calves. In order to maintain a stable herd population size, the internal replacement rate for cows, i.e., the number of calves maintained as heifers, and the yearly purchase rate for bulls were empirically estimated to restore the starting herds size ( Table 2) . As bTB prevalence is currently very low in Canadian herds (El Allaki et al., 2016) , it was assumed that the purchased bulls would not be infected with bTB. Commonly to most herds in the study area, cow replacement was assumed to be done entirely with their own stock.
The month of the calving season offset was randomly chosen at the beginning of every simulation's run for each herd, with probabilities corresponding to those described in the WCCCS (Table 2) .
Based on this survey, the calving season was assumed to start between January and May and spanned 3 months: 75% of pregnant cows gave birth in the first month, 20% in the second, and 5% in the third. Calves weaning happened once a year, and its timing for each herd was selected from September to December. The probability of selecting each of these months was described in the WCCCS (Table 2 ). In addition, weaning months were chosen so that calving and weaning could not be <6 or >12 months apart. For the sake of simplicity, it was assumed that at the time of weaning the retained replacement heifers were moved to the adult cow class. New bulls were purchased between February and April. Natural death rates were as reported in the WCCCS (Table 2) . Mortalities for cows, bulls, and heifers were assumed to be homogeneously distributed throughout the year. Calf mortality is generally higher during the neonatal period and, following Wittum et al. (1994) , we set it at 1.47% per month for the first 2 months. From the third month until the calves were weaned (on average, a total of 8 months from calving to weaning), mortality was equally distributed to a cumulative yearly value of 6.9% (Table 2) . Removal of cull cows for slaughter was assumed to happen on a quarterly basis (March, June, September, and December), with a higher value at the beginning of December because typical management procedures call for the slaughter of cows failing a pregnancy test before winter feeding begins. Bull culling was assumed to happen once a year, at the end of the breading season: this would be either September for herds calving earlier in the year (January or February), or December for herds calving later (March to May). A proportion of each herd was moved to summer pasture during June each year, and bulls and cows returned to the main herd in September and November, respectively. Demographic stochasticity was incorporated by drawing the exact number of animals for each event (e.g., death, removal, birth, replacement, and movement to pasture) from a Poisson distribution.
| The index-herd model
The index-herd model consisted of a dynamic within-herd bTB epidemic model, with the particular characteristic that during summer the herd split into three groups, each with its own transmission dynamics. These three groups represented the cattle going to two pastures (labelled A and B for convenience), and those staying in the main herd facility. The model included three main parts: the herd demographics, the bTB dynamics, and the surveillance system.
Although in the following sections the model is described in a deterministic format, all the results are obtained with stochastic simulations of potential bTB outbreaks using a fixed monthly time step following the τ-leap algorithm (Gillespie & Petzold, 2003; Keeling & Rohani, 2008) . This method was chosen for its computational efficiency, and given the slow dynamics of bTB infection, the step was set to 1 month. All models, analyses, and parallel simulations were done in R version 3.4.1 (R Core Team, 2016) , using the mc2d package for the PERT distribution (Pouillot & Delignette-Muller, 2010) , and ggplot2 for graphic representations (Wickham, 2009 ).
T A B L E 1 Characteristics of the herds categorized as high-risk during the observed bTB outbreak, including type and size of contacts with the index herd (#1) 
For the sake of simplicity, here μ represents all demographic inputs (birth, purchase, or ageing) and outputs (death, removal, and/ or ageing). The parameters σ Ο and σ R are the transition rates from
Occult to Reactive and from Reactive to Infectious, respectively, with 1/σ Ο and 1/σ R representing the average time spent in the Occult and Reactive statuses. The distribution of these two parameters was derived from the literature (Table 3) . Since the herds included in this study were large and extensively managed, following Álvarez et al. (2014) the within-herd transmission rate was assumed to be frequency-dependent. Specifically, the within-herd force of infection (λ) was set as λ = βI/N, where β is the effective contact rate, I is the number of infected individuals in the herds, and N is the total number of individuals (N = S + O + R + I). 
| Estimating the time of introduction
The first objective of this study was to estimate the time of introduction (ToI) of bTB in the index-herd. An Approximate Bayesian
Computation -Sequential Monte Carlo (ABC-SMC) like algorithm (Toni, Welch, Strelkowa, Ipsen, & Stumpf, 2009) , called the pseudo-ABC algorithm hereafter, was used to estimate the duration of the infection in the index herd, from which the ToI probability distribution was derived. The contact rate (β), the β-scaling factor for calves (Φ), and the slaughterhouse sensitivity for infectious animals (Se sla )
were also estimated using this algorithm.
The ABC-SMC method can be used to estimate a set of parameters starting from their prior distributions without explicitly specifying a likelihood function, and has already been used in the bTB modelling literature (Brooks-Pollock et al., 2014; Conlan et al., 2012) . With respect to the original ABC algorithm, the idea of SMC is to sample the parameters' populations from a sequence of approximate ABC posteriors with increasingly lower acceptance tolerances (Kypraios, Neal, & Prangle, 2017) . The advantage of this technique is that it concentrates on parameter space regions with relatively high acceptance probabilities, thus making the algorithm more computationally efficient. Generally, the acceptance tolerance is based on the distance ( 
To obtain the number of detected animals (D A , D C , and F), all simulations ran until bTB was detected in the herd. In order to correctly estimate the ToI, two precautions had to be taken. The first one regarded the choice of the number of additional parameters to estimate and their priors. In fact, this was limited to three: φ, β, and Se sla .
The first parameter, φ, was assumed to be uniformly distributed between 0.25 and 0.75. For β, a betaPERT distribution was used, with minimum, maximum, and mode based on estimates from the literature (see Table 3 for the list of references). Since a frequency-dependent transmission model was adopted, only the published works that used Se sla was also represented via a betaPERT distribution. However, in this case we set the mode to 0.86, following a study on a similar area (Michigan, US, by Norby et al., 2004) , while the minimum and maximum were respectively set equal to 0 and 1 to account for a broad range of values. The second precaution was to modify the ABC-SMC algorithm by making it accept only the parameters that could replicate the exact number of infected animals observed in the index herd (d = 0). Since tolerance was not decreasing, the main purpose of the steps became to explore the parameters space through a perturbation of the previous steps particle with a Gaussian kernel, with variance set to the observed variance of the previous step, times 0.68 (Brooks-Pollock et al., 2014; Filippi, Barnes, Cornebise, & Stumpf, 2013) . The estimation was run through five steps, with 60,000 set of parameters per represented by the following ordinary differential equations system:
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where Ψ represents the pasture mixing rate. The summation was done on all j herds except the ith herd, for which within-herd transmission dynamics held. The pasture mixing rate was defined over the interval (0,1), reflecting how well the animals mix in pastures. A value of Ψ = 0 represented no mixing between animals of different herds on pasture (i.e., no potential infectious contacts), while Ψ = 1 implied homogeneous mixing of animals from different herds.
| Pasture model simulations
The spread of bTB on pasture lands was simulated using the Canadian 2016 outbreak data (Table 1) . Other than the index herd (#1), 15 direct contact high-risk herds identified during the epidemiological investigation conducted by the CFIA were included in the model.
Twelve of these herds co-mingled some or all of their cattle with the index herd on one of the two summer pastures (pasture A, n = 8 herds and pasture B, n = 4 herds; see Table 1 ). Two herds (#3 and #4; Table 1) 
| Surveillance system
Both the index-herd and pasture models included a surveillance component based on Canada's current national surveillance system and eradication policy for bTB. This includes multiple surveillance components: routine slaughter inspection, tuberculin testing for specific groups of animals, and mandatory reporting of any suspect cases (El Allaki et al., 2016 ). In the model, slaughterhouse surveillance was applied to all adults removed from herds for slaughter in the next time step, as well as to the calves leaving the herd for fattening, after a delay correspondent to the time necessary to reach 18 months of age, the typical age at slaughter. This test is also identified in the literature as gross necropsy or meat inspection.
The slaughterhouse inspection sensitivity for infectious adults and calves (Se sla ) was estimated through the pseudo-ABC algorithm. As occult and reactive animals might not have developed granulomas at the time of slaughter, the slaughterhouse inspection sensitivity was scaled down by a factor κ. It was assumed that occult animals could not be detected at slaughterhouse (κ = 0). For reactive adults and calves, κ was drawn from a betaPERT distribution, with minimum, mode, and maximum set to 0, 0.05, and 0.25, respectively. The proportion of infected calves that transitioned from compartments O to R and from R to I during the fattening period was calculated from an exponential function with rates σ Ο and σ R , respectively.
In Canada, any confirmed case of bTB detected at slaughter is traced back to every herd that the index animal has resided in from birth to death in order to conduct the investigation and, if the disease is confirmed, take action to eradicate the disease. The IDEXX Elisa sensitivity was modelled with a beta distribution, with parameters α and β set to 159 and 191, respectively. These parameters were estimated from published data on the test sensitivity in animal populations with a low bTB prevalence (New Zealand and USA) (Buddle et al., 2013; Trost et al., 2016; Waters et al., 2011 , 2018) , and it was modelled with a beta-PERT distribution as described above.
Following the first bTB detection, two scenarios were modelled for the index and high-risk direct-contact herds. The first scenario aimed to represent the situation that prevailed during the 2016 outbreak: the detection of at least one infected individual (since the model is stochastic, more than one individual might be detected at the same time in a simulation run) triggered a WHT in all systems'
herds. This test included a CFT for all adults, followed by an EPM for all reactors and a gross necropsy (meat and tissues inspection)
for all non-reactors. The necropsy implied that all tested herds were subject to depopulation irrespectively of the CFT result, in order to improve the chances of detecting potentially infected animals and thus to evaluate whether to extend the outbreak's tracing investigation further.
In the second scenario, an alternative control policy for the highrisk contact herds was explored. This reflects what is done in countries where the control of bTB includes test-and-removal protocols, such as the US 2 and Great Britain. 3 Specifically, this consisted of a repeated WHT (CFT on all adults) that was applied to all direct-contact high-risk herds following the initial detection at slaughterhouse.
Whole herd tests were modelled quarterly for a maximum period of 3 years starting 1 month after the initial detection, for a maximum of 13 WHT. The output of the surveillance modelling was the proportion of herds detected at the end of the testing period, as well as at each WHT. Once a herd was determined to be infected, it was not subject to WHT anymore. Since the main objective of this alternative scenario analysis was to assess the ability of such control practice to identify infected herds, these herds were not monitored after the detection. It was assumed that herds were quarantined during this period. This implied no possibility of between-herd spread of infection, although within-herd transmission of bTB was allowed to continue. Note that during the quarantine all adult animals leaving the herds for slaughterhouse were subject to an EPM test, while weaned calves underwent first a CFT, followed by a meat inspection for the positive ones.
| RESULTS

| Description of the outbreak
A 5-year old Canadian cow slaughtered in the USA on September 6, 2016 was found to be infected with bovine TB (bTB) following postmortem examination and isolation of Mycobacterium bovis in bacterial culture. The cow was traced to a cow-calf operation in Alberta, and disease eradication and investigation measures were initiated by the CFIA on the index farm. Live animal testing was conducted on all animals aged 12 months or more, which were then subject to postmortem examination after the whole herd was slaughtered. During the post-mortem examination, five additional infected animals were identified and confirmed by isolation of M. bovis.
Moreover, the disease investigation brought to the identification of 15 herds that had high-risk direct contact with the index herd (Table 1 and Figure 1 , panel c). All these herds were subject to WHT, depopulation, and post-mortem examination, but no other infected animal was detected. In addition, 130 farms whose animals had been exposed to the index herd were identified. A total of 34,000 animals were tested. Depending on the type of exposure to the index herd, those with a reaction or non-negative result to a screening test were subject to either supplementary testing or enhanced post-mortem examination after slaughter. All test results were negative.
| Index-herd model
According The detected outbreaks were subject to the follow-up wholeherd testing (WHT) for herds not already detected by the slaughterhouse surveillance (between 59.6% and 40.5% of all infected herds). In the first control scenario (live animal CFT testing followed by EPM for reactors and gross necropsy for non-reactors), it was estimated that the WHT could have missed between 8.3%
(Ψ = 0) and 10.2% (Ψ = 1) of the infected herds, while another 6.5% (Ψ = 0) and 13.1% (Ψ = 1) of infected herds were non-detectable, meaning that all their bTB infected animals were at the occult stage (Table 4) . The single WHT test was able to identify on average 64.0% of the bTB infected herds, ranging from 67.3% (Ψ = 0) to 62.6% (Ψ = 1). 
| DISCUSSION
One of the main objectives of this study was to estimate the time of bTB introduction into the only infected herd of the 2016 Western Canada outbreak. Our results showed that the introduction most likely happened 3 years and 3 months before detection. This is consistent with another simulation-based model study on North-American cow-calf herds (Smith et al., 2013) , as well as with the epidemiology of the disease, considering the long and highly variable latency period of bTB (see references in Table 3 ). Since the parameters governing transmission dynamics could be strongly affected by management practices, we decided to estimate the effective contact rate (β), the contact rate scaling factor for calves (φ), and the baseline slaughterhouse test sensitivity (Se sla ) for infectious animals.
The estimated effective contact rate (β) was 1.92, thus falling in the range of what found in the published literature, but slightly lower than the median value (median 2.2 and range 0.61-5.2, references in Table 3 ). This could reflect the fact that our model only considers extensive cow-calf herds, while most existing studies include multiple production types.
The effective contact rate for calves, which for a long part of the year represents almost half of the herd, was estimated to be 44% For all three estimated parameters, the 95th credible interval did not substantially differ from the prior distribution range. This was a consequence of the limited data available for summary statistics, which constrained the parameters' estimation power. As a result, the obtained Se sla posterior distribution (coefficient of variation 0.32) was broader than the informed prior (coefficient of variation 0.22).
Also, we had to provide a set of informed prior distributions for the parameters of interest, as well as find a stricter algorithm for parameter estimation. In particular, the prior distribution for φ needed to be restricted to 0.25 and 0.75 in order to ensure the algorithm convergence. This was possible because the previous literature already reported values restricted to this range for this parameter (Brooks-Pollock et al., 2014; El Allaki et al., 2016) . The Se sla prior distribution mode was set to the literature estimate in a similar rearing system (86%, Norby et al., 2004) . Although this value was higher than other literature estimates (see above cited references), it was counterbalanced by using a very wide range (from 0% to 100%) to incorporate variability. Moreover, a betaPERT model was chosen for the prior distribution, resulting in a mean and median of 74% and 77% respectively, that is, values similar to existing estimates. Finally, as described above, the parameter that we estimated referred to the slaughterhouse inspection sensitivity applied to infectious (i.e., shedding) animals only. Nevertheless, the shape of the posterior distributions added information to the model as compared with the prior distributions. By accepting only parameters that produced no distance between the observed and simulated summary statistics, our algorithm was de facto a hybrid between ABC and Exact Bayesian
Computation. This was done following Kypraios et al. (2017) , who areas (Farnham, Norby, Goldsmith, & Wells, 2012; Norby et al., 2004 ) was higher than that used in the simulations (Nuñez-Garcia et al., 2018) . The reasons supporting this decision were to use a more conservative approach towards the effectiveness of WHT, as well as to use a more recent estimate. As reported above, no infected cattle was identified in any of the 15 herds, but given the typically long incubation period of bTB and imperfect test sensitivities, the infection of these herds could not be completely ruled out.
The simulations showed that the probability of spread through pasture was limited but non-negligible, and that most infected herds would have had a very low number of infected animals at the time of the outbreak detection. In addition, the simulation results showed that the probability of an infected herd failing the follow-up single WHT was below or equal to 10% (depending on the pasture mixing rate). However, there was a further probability of 6.5%-13.1% that the infection in the herd was at an early stage (only occult animals) and thus non-detectable. This is important because these herds could go undetected for long time before an individual develops the symptoms or becomes responsive to a test. Nonetheless, if we take into account gross numbers, it was estimated 2.5% probability of observing at least two occult herds and at least one undetected infected herd.
By adopting a different control scheme (quarantine and series whole-herd CFT) we observed that most detections occurred during the first test (whose performance was very similar to the WHT test in the current control scenario), while the other infections were detected within the second to fifth test. As expected, increasing the pasture mixing rate increased the probability of the infection being spread to other herds, but it had no substantial effect on the number of faded-out outbreaks. The number of natural elimination events was due to the demographic stochasticity, as the introduced latent cow can be removed before infecting other animals. To support this, we observed that, in the great majority of faded outbreaks, no other herd beside the index one was infected, and we found only few cases with one or two other infected herds. The number of undetected (ongoing) outbreaks was negatively affected by the pasture mixing rate value, because the probability of outbreak detection increased with the number of infected herds.
Given the impact of potentially having multiple infected herds in a previously bTB-free country, as well as the potential for spread to susceptible wildlife (such as elk or cervids) which may be present in the outbreak area, Canada has implemented an aggressive depopulation and testing strategy in case of bTB detection.
The regular surveillance strategy currently in place in Canada consists of slaughterhouse inspection, the most common method for bTB surveillance in many countries (Álvarez et al., 2014; Fischer, van Roermund, Hemerik, van Asseldonk, & de Jong, 2005; Rossi et al., 2015; Smith, Tauer, Sanderson, & Grohn, 2014; VanderWaal, Gilbertson et al., 2017) . Our results showed that this method was able to detect about two-third of the total simulated outbreaks. Similar results were found by Rossi et al. (2015) for dairies in Northern Italy, by assuming slaughterhouse inspection as the only detection method in place. The undetected outbreaks (21%-22% of the total simulated outbreaks) usually involved the index herd and at most one other herd. Given the rareness of bTB in Canada, adopting further methods for surveillance might not be economically feasible. However, as
VanderWaal, Gilbertson et al., 2017 pointed out, increasing the sensitivity of the carcass inspection by enhancing veterinarians' training can substantially improve surveillance performances. This might be valuable for systems such as the one we studied, in which bTB surveillance relies heavily on carcass inspection for detection.
There has been growing attention towards between-herd disease transmission pathways other than animal movements for trade, such as wildlife (Porphyre, McKenzie, & Stevenson, 2007) , farms visitors (Nöremark, Frössling, & Lewerin, 2013) , veterinarians (Rossi et al., 2017) , and summer pastures (Vidondo & Voelkl, 2018) . Previous and thus provide further insights for epidemic surveillance and control. In fact, another study of a local network of 49 cattle herds in a pastoralist management system in Kenya showed how the contact structure, and thus the potential epidemic spread, could be strongly affected by seasonality (VanderWaal, Enns et al., 2017) .
One important question when considering the potential spread of diseases on community pasture is the level of mixing between animals coming from different herds during pasture grazing. Our analysis showed that the level of mixing on pasture might have a non-negligible effect on bTB spread. Cattle usually graze in small rather than large groups (Harris, Johnson, McDougald, & George, 2007) , and Stephenson, Bailey, and Jensen (2016) showed that the stability of the contacts depends on the herd size, with cattle from smaller herds tending to have more stable connection with other cows. However, the amount of association between cattle from different herds remains unclear. More observation studies are needed to provide a valuable estimate of the mixing pattern between individuals from different herds, including the use of GPS tracking systems (Stephenson et al., 2016) . Another viable option could be the constitution of a panel of experts (e.g., farmers, veterinarians, animal behaviour experts) to provide an estimation of the pasture mixing rate. This method has already proved to be effective to deal with unknown parameters in other livestock contexts (Bates, Thurmond, & Carpenter, 2003; Kinsley, Patterson, VanderWaal, Craft, & Perez, 2016 ).
In conclusion, while mathematical modelling might have a limited use as a stand-alone tool for epidemic risk management, this work showed how it could help address specific questions when it is used alongside epidemiological investigations. The model estimated crucial information about the outbreak of bTB in Western Canada during the fall of 2016, in particular the time of introduction. This information could be used to conduct further epidemiological investigation, by focusing on the contacts of the index herd during the most likely introduction time. This modelling framework was also able to estimate the probability of bTB spread to high-risk contact herds, which was not negligible, showing how summer pastures represent a potential transmission pathway for infectious diseases in livestock. In particular, this could be a problem for elusive infections such as bTB, which, despite being characterized by slow transmission dynamics, can still represent a threat for systems entailing seasonal management. Finally, the findings of this study could enhance the understanding of the bTB spread in cow-calf herds managed seasonally, as well as provide a state-of-the-art tool for bTB preparedness and response.
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